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U.S. TRADE POLICY TOWARD THE NEW NICS
OF SOUTHEAST ASIA
Linda YC. Lim*
As export and economic growth in Korea and Taiwan has slowed
since 1988, it has increased dramatically in several countries of South-
east Asia. Thailand, for one, is chalking up a second year of eleven
percent real GDP growth in 1989 to become the fastest-growing econ-
omy in the world. Malaysia and even the Philippines are not far be-
hind, with growth predicted to reach the six to eight percent range for
the second or third year in a row. Even Indonesia's growth is rising
above five percent for the first time since the oil price slump of the
early 1980s. Manufactures now account for over half, in some cases
well over half, of merchandise exports in all four of these ASEAN
countries. This has caused them to be referred to by the international
business press, with varying degrees of enthusiasm, as the next newly
industrializing countries ["NICs"] - the next Koreas and Taiwans,
only bigger (with the exception of Malaysia).
U.S. trade policy towards Japan, Korea, and Taiwan is, in part,
responsible for the recent rapid growth in export manufacturing in the
ASEAN countries. These include Singapore, which like Thailand
grew at eleven percent in 1988 and will probably reach nine percent
growth in 1989, outstripping the Northeast Asian NICs. Unlike Ko-
rea and Taiwan, Singapore has actually benefited from recent U.S.
trade policy, largely because of its close links with the other ASEAN
economies. The appreciation of the won and the NT$ under U.S.
pressure and the removal of GSP privileges for the NICs have - to-
gether with their rising wages, labor shortages, and unrest - shifted
international competitiveness to the near-NICs of Southeast Asia. To-
gether with the appreciation of the Japanese yen, these factors have,
since 1987, brought about a huge influx of Asian foreign investment,
relocating export industries to the ASEAN countries. Taiwan now
rivals Japan as the largest foreign investor in Thailand, Malaysia, and
the Philippines, and last year tied with West Germany as the largest
foreign investor in Indonesia. Together with increased investment
from Hong Kong, Singapore, and South Korea, this influx has pushed
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the U.S. down to third or fourth place in the region's foreign invest-
ment stakes.
The trade flows already emanating from these investment flows
suggest some of the issues that arise for U.S. trade policy and trade
relations with Southeast Asia.
First, since 1986, the Southeast Asian countries' trade balances
with the U.S. have turned from chronic deficits to persistent surpluses.
Still, by Korean and Taiwan standards, these are still small. Unlike
Korea and Taiwan, these countries mostly run global trade deficits.
Discounting oil, a very important factor in the trade of Malaysia and
Indonesia especially, Southeast Asian trade with Japan, Korea, and
Taiwan is also in deficit. What this adds up to is the familiar "triangu-
lar pattern of trade," whereby Southeast Asian countries, like Korea
and Taiwan, import capital goods and manufactured inputs from Ja-
pan (and increasingly also from the NICs), process them locally, and
then export the final products to the U.S. and other countries.
From the U.S. point of view, this investment and trade pattern has
several undesirable implications. The fact that many Japanese, Ko-
rean, and Taiwanese companies manage to maintain their interna-
tional competitiveness and market share by relocating to or sourcing
from cheaper Southeast Asian locations reduces the benefits to U.S.-
based industry of the worldwide currency realignment since 1985.
Their East Asian competitors may actually become more, rather than
less competitive. Japan, Korea, and Taiwan are in effect diverting part
of their bilateral trade surpluses with the U.S. through cheaper third
countries, from which they then "attack" U.S. industry in its home
market. What's more, these countries offer them a host of investment
incentives which reduce their local costs of operation, such as tax holi-
days, subsidized industrial estates and utilities, and preferential tariff
treatment of imported inputs.
As Japan, Korea, and Taiwan open their domestic markets to im-
ports, these may come from their own relocated factories abroad, or
from independent local manufacturers in Southeast Asia rather than
from U.S.-based firms. Location in Southeast Asia also gives Japa-
nese, Taiwanese, and Korean manufacturers an advantage in supply-
ing the rapidly growing Southeast Asian markets, which might
otherwise be good markets for U.S. exports. In the absence of com-
mensurate U.S. investment, the Southeast Asian markets may become
"locked up" for good by the Japanese in particular, as they transfer
entire vertically integrated production structures and distribution net-
works there, replicating the tight supplier-customer linkages that
make the Japanese market so difficult to penetrate at home. This may
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make it difficult, if not impossible, for U.S. producers to penetrate
these markets in the future, despite declining tariff barriers in the re-
gion and the absence of a Europe-1992-style Pacific regional economic
bloc - which, for various reasons, is unlikely to emerge.
Thus, the "Southeast Asian solution" for Japanese, Korean, and
Taiwanese firms relocating there in the face of the U.S. trade policy
actions does more than simply limit the positive impact of the world-
wide currency realignment on the U.S. trade balance. It also spawns
second-generation Koreas and Taiwans and knits them more tightly
together as Japanese-dominated economic territories, shutting out
U.S. industry from promising growth markets. At the same time, this
process is stimulating the development of new NIC multinationals.
Forced by rising currencies and the loss of GSP privileges to "go inter-
national," companies from the NICs may eventually become sophisti-
cated enough to be major players on the world competitive stage. In
short, U.S. trade policy towards Korea and Taiwan has done a very
good job of promoting the competition in Southeast Asia.
From the Southeast Asian point of view, U.S. trade policy towards
Japan, Korea, and Taiwan has been a bonanza, bringing a windfall of
foreign investment and manufactured exports, and spurring economic
and industrial growth. This has not come without costs in terms of a
worsening trade policy relationship with the U.S The removal of
GSP privileges for the NICs, for example, immediately made Thailand
the largest recipient of U.S. GSP in Asia and the third largest in the
world, thereby bringing it to the unwelcome attention of U.S. policy-
makers.
Of all the Southeast Asian countries, Thailand is the most like Ko-
rea and Taiwan in the nature of the U.S. trade policy actions that it is
attracting. Its GSP eligibility has been challenged on grounds of inad-
equate protection of intellectual property rights, for which it has been
put on the USTR's Super 301 priority watch list. It is also facing an
investigation of inadequate labor rights. The Thai cigarette market is
the controversial target of USTR market-opening measures. The
country has faced antidumping actions on steel, ball-bearings (made
by a Japanese company), and other products. As it exports more
manufactures to the U.S. - made by Japanese, Taiwanese, Korean,
Hong Kong, and Singaporean as well as Thai companies - it may
become the target of more U.S. trade policy actions.
Yet, Thailand cannot retreat to exporting the simpler products of
an earlier time: witness the U.S. Farm Act of 1985 which dumped
U.S. surplus rice on the world market, undercutting the poor Thai
farmer who is otherwise the most efficient producer in the world. This
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was an important psychological, as well as economic, event which
drove home to the Thai that they cannot rely on market forces and
primary product exports to develop, but need to accelerate their indus-
trialization. Within the manufacturing sector, U.S. trade policy ac-
tions have also caused the Thai to lose their enthusiasm for cheap,
labor-intensive products like garments and textiles which are subject
to import quotas that limit their growth. Today, what the Thai are
exporting or gearing up to export, with the help of their Asian investor
friends and some U.S. companies, are cars and computer equipment,
rather than rice and shirts, all within the space of two to three years.
Elsewhere in Southeast Asia, many of the same trade policy issues
arise, though nowhere as concentrated or acrimonious as in the case of
Thailand. A couple of years ago following the Korea-Taiwan model,
the U.S. tried to get Singapore to appreciate its currency, claiming it
was undervalued by ten percent. This pressure has ceased and the
U.S. now generally praises Singapore for its open market, recognizing
it as clearly the best of the NICs with respect to trade practices and,
indeed, as a model for the whole world. However, Singapore, like
Thailand, has also been the target of various antidumping actions, in-
cluding the same one against Minnebea ball-bearings.
Malaysia is next to Singapore in terms of the openness of its trade
and investment policies, and much more open than Korea and Tai-
wan. The Malaysian dollar is widely regarded to be undervalued, but
the U.S. has not put a great deal of pressure on Malaysia to appreciate
its currency. The main source of trade tension was the AFL-CIO peti-
tion in 1988-89 for Malaysia to be denied U.S. GSP privileges on
grounds of labor rights violations because of restrictions on unioniza-
tion in the (U.S.-multinational-dominated) electronics industry. This
petition was denied after a USTR investigation which concluded that,
not only had Malaysia "made progress" in the area of labor rights, but
that labor conditions in the country were good and in some cases even
superior to those in the U.S. Regarding Indonesia, the chief trade fric-
tion has been over intellectual property rights protection, a field in
which Indonesia has recently passed legislation.
There is no question that as the ASEAN countries move up to
NIC status in the footsteps of Korea and Taiwan, the U.S. will in-
creasingly focus its trade policy attention on them. This is the main
reason why Malaysia vigorously denies that it even aspires to NIC
status, and goes about frequently and publicly proclaiming all the rea-
sons that it is "not a NIC." Though there are similarities in the trade
policy situations of the established and the new NICs, there are also
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some differences that may influence their policy relationship with the
U.S.
First, with the partial exception of Malaysia, the Southeast Asian
next-NICs are very much poorer than Korea and Taiwan are today, or
even than they were ten years ago. Thailand's per capita annual in-
come is about $1,000, the Philippines' per capita annual income about
$700, and Indonesia's less than $600 a year. As still-poor developing
countries, they will retain developing-country designation and treat-
ment - including GSP privileges - for a long time yet to come.
Many of the arguments which underlie these countries' resistance to
U.S. pressure on trade issues also reflect concern about the welfare
effects on their poor populations who, for example, cannot afford to
pay for brand-name pharmaceuticals or expensive copyrighted text-
books, videos and computer software, but can afford cheaper generic
medications, copies, and imitations.
Second, these economies have been rapidly liberalizing their trade
and foreign investment regimes. With the exception of Indonesia, they
have always been more open economies than were Korea or Taiwan.
The U.S. is anxious not to jeopardize this process of economic liberali-
zation, although it has, thus far, been Japan and the other Asian
NICs, not the U.S., which have most availed themselves of the new
opportunities presented by liberalizations.
Third, because of their past relative openness, the Southeast Asian
countries host substantial amounts of U.S. foreign investment - much
more than Korea and Taiwan. In cumulative terms, U.S. investment
is probably still close to that of the Japanese in most countries. Thus,
unlike Korea in particular, these countries have many friends in
America - U.S. multinationals located here, particularly in oil and
high-tech, who would be hurt by some U.S. trade policy actions and
who can lobby effectively against them in the U.S. itself.
Fourth, the ASEAN countries are long-time friends and important
Third World allies of the U.S. They have supported U.S. positions on
many international issues and in many international fora, from Cam-
bodia in the United Nations to free trade in agriculture and services at
GATT. They also have the capacity to act together on regional or
international issues of mutual interest, and thus possess some bargain-
ing power, both individually and collectively, with the U.S.
Fifth, related to this is the lesser direct dependence of the ASEAN
countries on the U.S. than either Korea or Taiwan. Their exports are
more diversified, with no country sending more than a quarter - in
most cases, less than a fifth - of its exports to the U.S. market. The
U.S. has also declined in relative terms as a foreign investor and aid
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donor in Southeast Asia, and wields much less leverage with govern-
ments of the region than it did before. Japan, on the other hand, is
now the region's largest foreign investor and aid donor as well as its
first or second most important trade partner. The U.S. has to be care-
ful that its actions do not push the Southeast Asians ever deeper into
the arms of the Japanese, to the detriment of the long-run competitive
position of U.S. firms themselves. U.S. trade policy actions in the last
few years have already alienated many of its friends in the region, with
the Singapore National Trades Union Congress, for one, publishing
and circulating throughout the international labor movement a pam-
phlet entitled, "U.S.A. - Big Brother or Bully?"
Finally, unlike Korea or Taiwan, the Southeast Asian new NICs
cannot be accused of being mercantilist. Despite their bilateral sur-
pluses with the U.S., they run global trade deficits, and exports are, to
them, a means to industrial development and material prosperity for
their people, not an end in themselves. They have also not repressed
domestic wages or consumption levels to promote exports and restrict
imports. And they are restrained by domestic politics from pursuing
such a strategy of high tariffs and artificially low wages.
What then, can or should the U.S. do to improve its trade position
in Southeast Asia, if not by employing the somewhat heavy-handed
methods which have only been partly successful in Korea and Taiwan?
The one answer that all Southeast Asians give is, "Invest more in our
countries" - to diversify their dependence on Japan, to make their
local markets more competitive, and to generate trade flows which
could even reverse the "triangular pattern of trade" and reduce their
trade deficits with Japan. In other words, U.S. firms should locate in
Southeast Asia not only to supply the local and regional markets, but
also to penetrate the Japanese, Korean and Taiwanese markets them-
selves - in the case of Japan, perhaps even benefitting from expanded
Japanese GSP. Unfortunately, American business does not appear to
be about to take this course of action on a large enough scale. With
Southeast Asian markets rapidly filling up with Japanese, and to a
lesser extent Korean and Taiwanese, capacity, it may already be too
Winter 1990]
